The State of Utah v. Robert Delaney : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1964
The State of Utah v. Robert Delaney : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
J. Harlan Burns; Attorney for the Appellant-Defendant;
A. Pratt Kesler; Ronald N. Boyce; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Delaney, No. 10073 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4511
lAW- uBiiXH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. No. 10073 
ROBERT DELANEY, 
Defend ant-Appellant 
\\ L E 0 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF \'fi~R 2 1 \.904 
--~ 
·-- b -----··-----·-·c~-~rl. Uta 
Appeal from Judgment of"lh~ ~- · ---Supreme 
5th District Court for Iron County 
Hon. C. Nelson Day, Judge 
.-\. PRATT KESLER 
J. HARLAN BURNS 
95 North Main 
Cedar City, Utah 
A_ttorney for the 
... 4ppellant-Defendant 
Attorney General ~S~'~-~ _;_; ._ 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Deputy Attorney General . ;~~-~1• .. ~u 
Attorne)•s for Plaintiff-Respot!:; 
1 
•• -·- .. ;· 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STA.rE~lENT OF l'HE KIND OF CASE ····················-------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ---------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ·····-···········-----------··········--···· 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ···················--------------------------··· 2 
ARGUMENT --------------···········-----·········-····-········-------------················ 8 
POINT I. THE COURT'S PARTISAN PARTICI-
PATION IN THE ROLE OF PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY AT THE VIEW, THE COURT'S 
AND OFFICER BURCH'S CONDUCT AT THE 
VIEW, THE COURT'S COMMENTS ON THE 
EVIDENCE AND THE POSSIBLE IMPRESSION 
THAT THE COURT WAS HOSTILE TO THE 
DEFENDANT DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT 
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A 
FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY ................ 8 
POINT II. IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR 
THE COURT AND THE STATE'S KEY WIT-
NESS TO CONDUCT THE VIEW OF THE 
PREMISES CONTRARY TO THE MANNER 
PROVIDED BY THE CLEAR AND EXPLICITY 
PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNO. 1953, 
7 7-31-26 ·····················-·--·····----------·-·---------------------·-··----------- 16 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT 
STRIKING OFFICER BURCH'S TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING THE CHORD MARK MEAS-
UREMENTS FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH 
TESTIMONY WAS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE 
OF THE RECOLLECTION REFRESHED RULE 
AND WAS NOT INDEPENDENT RECOLLEC-
TION OF MATTERS WITHIN THE PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE WITNESS ····-·········-----------·-- 18 
POINT IV. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVI-
DEXCE UPON \VHICH THE JURY COULD 
HAVE FOUND THE DEFENDANT GUlL TY .......... 20 
CO X CL USI ON ---------------·-----------------------·------_ ........................... ______ 22 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Com. v. Jeffs, 132 Mass. 5 ( 1882) --------------···········-··············-----··············· 19 
Hunter v. United States, 62 F .2d 217 (5th Cir. 1932) ............................ 14 
Martin v. Tipton, 261 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1953) ........................................ 18 
People v. Biddlecome, 3 Utah 208, 2 Pac .. 194 (1882) .......................... 13 
People v. Rigney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 625, 359 P.2d 23 ( 1961) .................... 14 
People v. Robinson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 50 ( 1960) ........................................ 14, 15 
Scruggs v. State, 34 Okla. Cr. 97, 244 Pac. 838 ( 1926) ........................ 17 
State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 158 P.2d 127 ( 1945) ........................ 13 
State v. Bayes, 47 Utah 474, 155 Pac. 335 (1916) ................................ 13 
State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 35 7 P.2d 183 ( 1960) ····-·······-------- 21 
State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 60 Pac. 403 ( 1900) ············----······-----·-- 14 
State v. Diaz, 76 Utah 463, 290 Pac. 727 ( 1930) ---------····-·-···················· 13 
State v. Gleason, 86 Utah 26, 40 P.2d 222 ( 1935) ................................ 13 
State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 ( 1931) .................................... 13 
State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 ~1936) ............................. .13, 14 
State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497,94 Pac. 987 (1908) ................................ 13 
State v. James, 32 Utah 152, 89 Pac. 460 ( 1907) .................................. 13 
State v. McVeigh, 35 Wash.2d 493, 214 P.2d 165 ( 1950) ...................... 17 
State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P.2d 102 (1958) ........................ 13 
State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah 312, 73 Pac. 562 (1903) ....................... .17, 21 
State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 ( 1945) .......................... 13 
CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES CITED 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12 ................................................................ 12 
Utah Code Anno. 1953, 41-6-43.10 ............................................................ 1 
Utah Code Anno. 1953, 77-31-26 ................................................................ 16 
Utah Code Anno. 1953, 77-31-31 ........................................................... .10, 12 
j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 







ST~~ TE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an indictable misdemeanor, automobile negli-
gent homicide case brought under U tab Code Anno. 
1953, 41-6-43.10. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial Court 
denied the defendant's motions for judgment notwith-
standing the ,·erdict and for a ne\v trial. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks a reversal of the verdict of guilty 
and a remand with instruction to enter a judgment of 
not guilty notwithstanding the jury~s verdict, and in the 
alternative, a remand with instruction for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A one car accident about midnight, March 2, 1963, 
in Cedar Canyon, about two miles \\rest of Cedar City, 
Utah, claimed the life of one of four occupants of the 
automobile. The defendant was charged with and tried 
for automobile negligent homicide under Utah Code 
Anno. 1953, 41-6-43.10. 
At the trial, Officer John R. Williams testified for 
the State that he had been an investigating officer at 
the scene of the accident. He described the location of 
the car and the body (Tr. 6). He testified that he and 
Officer William Burch made markings to identify skid 
and other marks ( Tr. 11, line 2) . He spoke of finding 
beer cans at the scene ( T r. 11, line 8) and said that one 
of the occupants of the car, not the driver, had stated 
to him that he guessed they had been racing a little 
(Tr. 6, line 20). He testified that he had previously said 
that he believed the defendant had not been drinking, 
and he testified, that there 'vas no indication that the 
defendant had been drinking (Tr. 14, line 2, 9). 
Officer William Burch also generally described the 
accident scene ( Tr. 23, line 28) . He testified that he 
and others made markings to sho\v the course of travel 
of the automobile (Tr. 27, line 16). He testified that he 
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made no measurement that night (Tr. 29, line 3) but 
that he and Sergeant Robert Reid and Trooper Elroy 
~[ason returned in the morning and made measurements 
(Tr. 29, line 15). He testified in detail and illustrated his 
testimony by use of a blackboard (Tr. 30 and following). 
Officer Burch testified concerning a skid test con-
ducted by him (Tr. 53, line 30) and concerning the 
grade of the road and the "super elevation" (bank of 
the curve) of the road (Tr. 55, line 14; Tr. 56, line 1, 
18). 
He testified that he made so-called "chord mark" and 
"middle ordinate" measurements of a scuff mark at the 
scene (Tr. 66, line 1). He then testified that from these 
measurements of the scuff mark he calculated the radius 
of the curve of the scuff mark to be 707 feet (Tr. 67, 
line 2). 
Officer Burch admitted on cross examination that at 
the time of the preliminary hearing he testified that "I 
don,t know that we even measured it," (Tr. 101, line 22) 
\rith reference to essential details about the measurements 
and their location. He did not have his notes about the 
measurements at the preliminary hearing nor did he ever 
subsequently find them (Tr. 140, line 1-7). 
On redirect examination he testified that some time 
subsequent to the preliminary hearing "Sergeant Reid 
and Trooper Mason and I determined together that that 
,,·as "·here "·e measured. It was just opposite the 50 foot 
mark" with reference to the chord mark and the middle 
ordinate measurements (Tr. 128, line 6) and "We re-
membered where \\~e measured it" (Tr. 139, line 20). 
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The defendant's motion to strike the testimony con-
cerning these measurements was denied by the Court, the 
Court commenting that he did not think the officer was 
fabricating, that that question was for the jury~ but the 
evidence would be retained on the recollection refreshed 
theory (Tr. 140, line 24). 
Mr. Ed M. Pitcher of the Utah State Highway Patrol 
was called as an expert witness. He was asked hypo-
thetical questions based upon the factual assumptions in 
Officer Burch's testimony including the radius of the 
scuff mark, the results of the skid test, the grade of the 
road, the super elevation of the road and other factors 
(Tr. 247~ line 11). He testified that under the facts 
assumed in the hypothetical question a car would have 
been traveling from 99.9 to 101 miles per hour (Tr. 252, 
line 1 7, 28) . He testified that a difference in the facts 
would make a difference in the result. Such differences 
might concern the material of the road (Tr. 255, line 24), 
foreign substances on the road (Tr. 255, line 29), mois-
ture conditions (Tr. 256, line 7), the chord mark meas-
urement and its location (Tr. 259~ line 27). 
The defendant testified that he had had four beers 
over a period of time earlier in the evening Tr. 4 73, line 
24; Tr. 475, line 15). However there \\'"as no evidence 
that he was or appeared to be intoxicated. Several \vit-
nesses~ including Officer Willian1s, Officer Burch, Dr. 
Graff, Diana Lynn Miller, Melvin Douglas Clark, and 
Kendall G. Cosslett testified that the defendant did not 
appear to have been intoxicated (Tr. 14, line 2, 9; Tr. 85, 
line 23 ~ Tr. 80, line 22; Tr. 368, line 17 ~ Tr. 435, line 
12; and Tr. 465, line 17. 21). 
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Mr. Higbee, another occupant of the car, testified 
that he did have beer with him but that the defendant 
had only one sip from an already opened can at the 
start of the trip, but not tnore (Tr. 299, line 27). 
A motion by the State that the jury be taken to vie\\' 
the premises was granted but the view was not actually 
takrn until near the end of the defendant's case in re-
buttal. Prior to taking the view, the Court indicated 
its intention to have Officer Burch or Trooper Mason 
point out marks and other things and locations that had 
been testified to (Tr. 445, line 4). 
Although the defendant objected to this proposed 
procedure ( Tr. 446, line 20) , Officer Burch and the 
Court did accompany the viewing party to the premises 
{Tr. 44 7, line 11 ) . The Court itself took charge of the 
view, commencing by describing the scene and com-
menting about "still visible" marks on the road, "paint or 
crayon" on the road ( Tr. 44 7, line 6) , pointing out 
various things, making comments, and conducting a de-
tailed, repetitive interrogation-discussion review with 
Officer Burch of his prior testimony concerning the scene 
and measurements ( Tr. 44 7 through 460) . 
The Court answered a juror's question (Tr. 451, line 
20). Other jurors asked questions which were answered 
by Officer Burch (Tr. 453, line 4, 12; Tr. 454·, line 14, 
21, 27; Tr. 455, line 9, 15, 17, 19, 21) or by the Court 
with a request to Officer Burch for approval of the 
ans\ver given by the Court (Tr. 451, line 20; Tr. 454, 
line 29). 
The Court propounded at least fifty-two questions to 
Officer Burch ( Tr. 44 7, through 460) , many of which 
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were leading questions (Tr. 44 7, line 28; Tr. 448, line 6, 
10, 15, 24, 28; Tr. 449, line 24, 28; Tr. 450, line 13, 26; 
Tr. 451, line 7, 11; Tr. 451, line 20; Tr. 452, line 9, 21, 
24; Tr. 454, line 8; Tr. 454, line 29; Tr. 456, line 14, 
19; Tr. 45 7, line 13, 29; Tr. 459, line 25) or included 
as part of the question or otherwise an observation of 
fact (Tr. 449, line 11; Tr. 451, line 20; Tr. 452, line 9, 
17, 27, 29; Tr. 454, line 29; Tr. 456, line 14). 
Counsel for the State took no part in the proceeding 
conducted by the Court at the viewing of the premises 
(Tr. 460, line 10, 13). 
Counsel for the defendant repeated his objection at 
the end of the viewing and the Court undertook a cau-
tionary instruction upon resumption of the proceedings in 
the courtroom (Tr. 462, line 1). 
The defendant testified in his own behalf that just 
before the accident his speed might have been between 
45 and 65 miles per hour (Tr. 484, line 18, 27); that 
just before the accident he started to speak to Mr. Higbee 
in the back seat about some records for the record player 
,vhich was in the front of the car (Tr. 485, line 11); that 
he did not recall whether he had both hands on the 
steering wheel or had turned to Mr. Higbee (Tr. 485, 
line 20); but that he did not turn his head far enough to 
see Mr. Higbee (Tr. 486, line 3) ; and that he then heard 
gravel under the car and the accident occurred (Tr. 486, 
line 7). 
He further testified that at the time he heard the 
gravel his speed was between 50 and 65 miles per hour 
(Tr. 489, line 2). He testified that when the car was 
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used for participation in supervised drag races it was 
specially tuned up and equipped (Tr. 489, line 21) but 
that it was not in that condition at the time of the acci-
dent (Tr. 490, line 1). 
Mr. Higbee, one of the occupants of the car, testified 
that the automobile was not traveling at the rate Mr. 
Pitcher had estimated but that at the most it might have 
been up to 55 or 60 miles per hour (Tr. 280, line 22; 
Tr. 302, line 26). 
~[r. Allen Brent Hatch, a witness in a passing car, 
estimated the speed of Mr. Delaney's car to be 70 at the 
highest (Tr. 317, line 2). His companion, Miss Sylvia 
Gale, testified that there was nothing unusual about the 
operation of the Delaney vehicle (Tr. 321). She doubted 
that it was traveling 70 miles per hour (Tr. 325, line 16) 
but did not think her companion necessarily wrong in 
his estimate (Tr. 325, line 24). 
Mr. Gary Mackelprang, an occupant of a following 
vehicle, testified that he had made a statement that the 
defendant's automobile might have been going 70 miles 
per hour (Tr. 337, line 2), but his then testimony under 
cross examination by the State was that the speed could 
have been as high as 70 but he doubted it (Tr. 336, line 
29.) 
Diana Lynn Miller, the fourth occupant of the de-
fendant's car testified that the defendant did not appear 
intoxicated (Tr. 368, line 19) ; that there was nothing 
unusual about his behavior (Tr. 386, line 17) ; that the 
operation of the vehicle seemed normal on the trip up 
the canyon (Tr. 375) and that there was no warning 
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or indication that the accident was going to happen (Tr. 
378, line 21). 
There was evidence that the posted speed limit on the 
road was 50 miles per hour (Tr. 68, line 28). 
The jury found the defendant guilty. The Court 
denied defense motions for judgment at the close of the 
State's case, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
and for a new trial. 
The foregoing statement of facts mentions in brief 
form the substantive and procedural matters which the 
defendant deems pertinent to the disposition of this 
appeal. In so doing, however, it necessarily omits con-
siderable evidentiary detail which can only be covered 
by recourse to the entire record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT'S PARTISAN PARTICI-
PATION IN THE ROLE OF PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY AT THE VIEW, THE COURT'S 
AND OFFICER BURCH'S CONDUCT AT THE 
VIEW, THE COURT'S COMMENTS ON THE 
EVIDENCE AND THE POSSIBLE IMPRESSION 
THAT THE COURT WAS HOSTILE TO THE 
DEFENDANT DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT 
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A 
FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY. 
The State's case depended upon proof of such speed 
as might constitute driving in reckless disregard of the 
safety of others. The State's case consisted of t\VO stages. 
In the first, Officer Burch provided the factual founda-
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tion needed for an expert witness's opinion as to speed. In 
the second, Mr. Ed M. Pitcher provided the opinion as 
to speed. 
Officer Burch testified as to all of the important 
clements of the foundation needed for the expert witness, 
including the skid test conducted by him, measurements 
and calculations by him, the grade of the road and the 
bank of the curve. The expert witness conducted no tests 
and made no measurements. 
On cross examination Officer Burch conceded that 
at the preliminary hearing he had not remembered cer-
tain essential facts concerning the alleged measurements 
and even that he had then stated that he did not know 
if they had been measured (Tr. 101, line 23, 27). The 
Court expressed its opinion that Officer Burch was not 
fabricating but that this was up to the jury (Tr. 140, 
line 24). 
Relying upon the factual foundation derived from 
Officer Burch's testimony, including the questionable 
measurements and calculations, the State's expert wit-
ness, Mr. Pitcher, estimated the speed of the automobile 
to be 99.9 to 101 miles per hour at the time of the making 
of the scuff marks. 
Mr. Pitcher said that alteration of the facts assumed 
in the hypothetical question would alter the result. This 
included the skid test, road conditions, and particularly 
the cord mark measurements. From the chord mark 
measurements the radius of the arc of the scuff mark 
can be determined and this figure is used in calculating 
speed. 
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All of the elements used for the hypothetical question, 
and particularly the chord mark measurements and the 
calculations derived therefrom, were contested by the 
defendant. Their proof was an essential part of the 
State's case. The jury view of the premises was part of 
the State's attempt to prove its case. 
The Court granted the State's request that the jury 
view the scene, indicating in so doing that it intended 
to have either Officer Burch or Trooper Mason point out 
marks and things at the scene. Despite the defendant's 
objection to this procedure, it was followed by the Court. 
Instead of appointing showers as required by Utah Code 
Anno. 1953, 77-31-31, the Court and Officer Burch 
served that function. The Court commenced with a gen-
eral description of the scene referring to what he called 
still visible paint or crayon marks and to nails driven 
into the road. The Court conducted a lengthy interroga-
tion-discussion with Officer Burch reviewing the testi-
mony he had given in court concerning the physical evi-
dence, markings, measurements and other details of the 
scene. The following Court-Burch discussion is typical 
(Tr. 447): 
The Court : This is the point where the scuff mark 
or skid mark that you testified to in your testimony 
commenced, is that correct? 
Burch: Yes. 
The Court: Now, will you point out where it went 
from this point? 
Burch: This is the point that it crossed the center 
line. (Indicating) 
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The Court: We are now at a point, as I recall, 60 
feet from the initial point where you had marked 
with the red crayon, is that correct? 
Burch : Yes, sir. That is correct. 
The Court: And this is the point where the scuff 
mark or skid mark that crossed the original 
painted center line of the highway, and this is 
approximately 60 feet in an easterly direction, is 
that correct? 
Burch: That's right. 
The Court: And you have designated this by a nail 
driven into the yellow line? 
Burch: That's right. 
The Court: And it is visible at this point? 
Burch: Yes. 
The Court undertook to answer questions posed by 
jurors, requesting Officer Burch's approval of his 
ans\vers. For example (Tr. 451, line 19): 
Juror Irene Bryant: Is this the area that supposedly 
the car had hit the bank? 
The Court: I'm under the impression, and if you 
gentlemen \vho investigated this could correct me, 
but \vhere the gravel first came out on the road -
that is large quantities of it~ was where the car 
hit the bank and it knocked the gravel out onto 
the road; and that was down where we were just 
talking about. Is that correct, Officer Burch? 
Burch: Yes. 
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Another example (Tr. 454, line 14) : 
Juror Meeks Dalton: I'd like to ask the distance from 
here to where the car left the road on the opposite 
side from where it started. 
The Court: You mean left the road on the north side? 
Juror Dalton: Yes. 
The Court: Well -
Juror Dalton: Where it tipped on its top. 
The Court: Well, you are asking before it tipped on 
its top. Now Officer Burch, do,vn where it tipped 
on its top -this is something I don't recall there 
was testimony given about. 
Burch: I don't know exactly on it top, no. 
The Court: Apparently it slid for some distance on 
its top, Mr. Dalton, and where it tipped and went 
on its top, you wouldn't know, would you? 
Burch: Not exactly, no. 
Utah Constitution, ... L\rticle I, § 12, states: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right . . . to have a speedy public trial by an im-
partial jury .... 
Utah Code Anno. 1953, 77-31-31, provides: 
[QJuestions of law are to be decided by the court, 
and questions of fact by the jury; . . . 
The law is clear on several basic propositions dealing 
with the right of an accused to an impartial jury trial of 
the facts of his alleged offense. 
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The jury shall be the sole trier of facts. People v. 
Biddlecome, 3 Utah 208, 2 Pac. 194 ( 1882); State v. 
Ba)'es, 47 Utah 474, 155 Pac. 335 ( 1916); State v. Green, 
89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 755 (1936) (dicta); State v. 
Green, 78 Utah 580 6 P.2d 177 ( 1931) ; State v. That-
cher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 ( 1945). 
It is equally well established that the judge shall not 
comment on the evidence. State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 
6 P.2d 177 ( 1931); State v. Gleason, 86 Utah 26, 40 
P.2d 222 ( 1935) (dicta); State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497, 
94 Pac. 987 ( 1908); State v. ]ames, 32 Utah 152, 89 Pac. 
460 ( 1907). 
The credibility of witnesses is a question solely for 
the jury. State v. Diaz, 76 Utah 463, 290 Pac. 727 
( 1930); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 
( 1936) (dicta). 
Although not always error, allowing the jurors to ask 
questions is properly frowned upon. State v .. Martinez, 
7lTtah 2d 387.326 P.2d 102 (1958); State v. Anderson, 
108Utah 130, 158P.2d 127 (1945). 
The intimate, partisan, detailed participation by the 
Court at the scene as though he were the prosecuting 
attorney rather than the judge could only result in the 
jury's minds in such an association of the judge with the 
State's case and its key witness, upon whose credibility 
and accuracy the entirety of the State's case depended, 
as would invariably give the impression that the Court 
favored the witness and believed his testimony. This we 
believe to be substantial, fundamental error, for while it 
may be proper for the Court to ask questions in appro-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
priate cases, it is manifestly improper for the Court to 
usurp the functions of counsel. State v. Green, 89 Utah 
437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936) (dicta); People v. Rigney, 10 
Cal. Rptr. 625, 359 P.2d 23 ( 1961) (dicta); People v. 
Robinson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 50 ( 1960); Hunter v. United 
States, 62 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1932). 
Extended interrogation cannot fail but to give an 
impression of belief or disbelief, depending on the circum-
stances. As this court explained in State v. Green, at page 
755: 
It is generally held that in the exercise of his 
right to question a witness, the judge should not 
indulge in an extensive examination or usurp the 
function of counsel. In a criminal case he should 
not by form of question or manner or extent of 
examination indicate to the jury his opinion as to 
the guilt of the defendant or the weight or suf-
ficiency of the evidence. Note, 84 A.L.R. 1172; 
... His examination should not be extensive be-
cause it is a matter of much difficulty for any 
person to indulge in an extensive examination of 
the witness without indicating a train of thought 
or some feeling with respect to the truth or falsity 
of the testimony being elicited. . . . 
Counsel for the State did not need the Court's able 
assistance for their conduct of their case was thorough, 
professional and competent. State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 
245, 60 Pac. 403 ( 1900) held it error for the Court to 
take over the examination of a witness and to ask leading 
questions when the counsel for the State was doing a 
capable job, for the reason that: 
[I]t is a fact vvell and universally known by 
courts and practitioners that the ordinary juror is 
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always anxious to obtain the opinion of the court 
on matters \vhich are submitted to his discretion, 
and that such opinion, if know to the juror, has a 
great influence upon the final determination of the 
issues. This information can be conveyed as readily 
to the jury by leading questions asked of them, and 
the manner of the judge in asking such questions, 
as by a direct comment upon the testimony in the 
charge to the jury. 
The recent case of People v. Robinson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 
50, ( 1960) held that it was error for the Court to take 
over the duties of the district attorney in the questioning 
of witnesses for in so doing he gives the jury the impres-
sion that he as allying himself v.rith the prosecution with 
inevitable harm to the defendant being the result. 
Other instances at the trial add to the cumulative 
effect of the Court's partisan participation. For example, 
the Court's comment that he did not think Officer Burch 
\\'as fabricating his testimony with reference to the con-
tested chord mark and middle ordinate measurements 
would serve to indicate credibility of the witness in the 
opinion of the Court (Tr. 140, line 24). At another point 
the Court expressed belief in the testimony of the witness 
concerning the air pressure in the tires of the automobile 
(Tr. 131, line 27). 
And" immediately after the State commenced its 
cross examination of the defendant by asking the follow-
ing question and getting the following answer : 
Question: With respect to your automobile, Mr. 
Delaney, isn't it a fact that it had a standard four-
speed transmission in it? 
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Answer: Yes, it did. But you could order one from 
the factory. 
the court interjected: 
Mr. Delaney, he didn't ask you if you could 
order one. He asked you what your car had. It is 
true that people can buy anything. Just answer the 
questions that are asked you. Go ahead, Mr. Gard-
ner. (Tr. 491, lines 5-13) 
Each of these numerous errors deprived the defendant 
of his right to a fair jury trial. Whether considered in-
dividually or cumulatively, the Court's partisan partici-
pation in the role of prosecuting attorney, the manner 
of conducting the view with the Court and the key witness 
for the State as joint showers and testifiers, the comments 
on the evidence during the view and the trial, and the 
possible impression that the Court was hostile to the 
defendant deprived the defendant of his right to a fair 
jury trial and constituted prejudicial error of a most 
fundamental nature. 
POINT II. IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR 
THE COURT AND THE STATE'S KEY WIT-
NESS TO CONDUCT THE VIEW OF THE 
PRE1fiSES CONTRARY TO THE MANNER 
PROVIDED BY THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT 
PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNO. 1953, 
77-31-26. 
Utah Code Anno. 1953, 77-31-26, provides that when 
the court deems a view proper 
... [I] t may order the jury to be conducted in a 
body, in the custody of an officer, to the place, 
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which must be shown to them by a person ap-
pointed by the court for that purpose; and the 
officer must be sworn to suffer no person to speak 
or communicate \vith the jury, nor do so himself, 
on any subject connected with the trial ... 
This statute does not authorize the Court to accom-
pany the jury to the scene; it does not authorize the 
taking of evidence, let alone a substantial amount of it, 
at the scene; it does not authorize the Court and the 
prosecution's key witness to act as showers at the scene. 
In State v. Mortensen, 26, Utah 312, 73 Pac. 562, at 
5 73 ( 1903) this court quoted with approval language 
from another opinion to the effect that a similar statute 
did not intend the judge to accompany the jury and that 
the statute commands that no one but the appointed 
officer speak to the jury and they are forbidden to speak 
about the subject of the trial. 
Substantial authority says that it is improper to take 
rvidence at the viewing of the premises. E.g., State v. 
~\lcVeigh, 35 Wash. 2d 493, 214 P.2d 165 ( 1950); 
Scruggs v. State, 34 Okla. Cr. 97, 244 Pac. 838 ( 1926). 
The statute plainly provides that the jury are to 
be conducted to the view by an officer sworn to suffer 
no person to speak to or communicate with the jury, nor 
to do so himself, on any subject connected with the trial. 
Instead of complying with this clear requirement, the 
Court conducted what amounted to an extensive review 
session of that evidence which was most damaging to the 
defendant. This review session was a joint venture be-
tween the Court and the State's key witness, Officer 
Burch. The statute authorizes the use of an impartial 
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person as a shower, it does not authorize, nor can we 
sanction, the type of partisan evidence taking~ comments, 
and general review of the State's key witness' testimony 
by himself and the Court at the vie\ving. 
Even in civil cases it has been held in error for a 
witness truck driver to participate in a viewing to the 
extent of merely pointing out where he commenced 
passing another vehicle. Martin v. TiptonJ 261 S.W. 2d 
809 (Ky. 1953). 
Even more so in a criminal case should the defendant 
have the right to have the proper procedures followed. 
The manner of the viewing in the instant was not only 
contrary to the plain wording of the statute, but apart 
from that constituted prejudicial error because of the 
partisan participation by the Court and the taking of 
evidence in such a mannner as to imply that the Court 
believed the testimony of Officer Burch. On either ground 
it constitutes reversible error. It deprived the defendant 
of a statutory safeguard for a fair trial and it deprived 
him of a fair trial. 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT 
STRIKING OFFICER BURCH'S TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING THE CHORD MARK MEAS-
UREMENTS FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH 
TESTIMONY WAS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE 
OF THE RECOLLECTION REFRESHED RULE 
AND WAS NOT INDEPENDENT RECOLLEC-
TION OF MATTERS WITHIN THE PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE WITNESS. 
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'fhc accident occurred on March 2. The measure-
ments, if any, \verc taken within a few hours. The pre-
liminary hearing 'vas held on April 12 ( Tr. 141, line 29) . 
At the preliminary hearing, Officer Burch had neither 
notes nor recollection as to 'vhere the important chord 
mark measurements were made. He testified "I don't 
know that we even measured it." (Tr. 139, line 5) 
On examination by the State, Officer Burch said he 
nc\'rr did find the purported notes ( Tr. 140, line 1-7) . 
In response to the question of how he did determine the 
placement of the measurements, he answered "Sergeant 
Reid and Trooper Mason and I determined together that 
that was 'vhere we measured," (Tr. 128, line 6) and 
"We remembered where we measured it." (Tr. 139, line 
20). 
The Court refused to strike the evidence, g1v1ng as 
the reason that it was admissible as recollection refreshed. 
The doctrine of recollection refreshed is not applicable 
to the instant situation. It is properly used when a witness 
on the stand cannot remember details of a matter, which 
details had been reduced to \vriting, and the writing is 
used for refreshing an independent recollection. Its pur-
pose is to allow the witness to testify from an independent 
memory that the facts are true. Com. v. Jeffs, 132 Mass. 
j ( 1882). 
In the instant case it seems quite clear that Officer 
Burch ,,·as not testifying from an independent memory 
of the facts but from a reconstructed "group recollection" 
resulting from the discussion among t\vo others, who did 
not testify as to the pertinent facts, and himself. This 
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kind of a reconstructed group recollection is an inadmis-
sible mixture of conjecture and hearsay, two-thirds of 
which is not subject to cross examination and which does 
not meet any criterion for admission. 
In addition to error in admitting the evidence at all, 
the Court indicated that it did not think Officer Burch 
was fabricating, thus adding the weight of the Court to 
highly questionable evidence, evidence which went to the 
heart of the State's case. 
The witness did not even remember when the pur-
ported discussion took place. He could not even place 
the month (Tr. 142, line 1-14). 
We respectfully submit that under the circumstances 
it is clear that the witness did not testify from an in-
dependent recollection of the facts but from a recon-
structed group recollection which was not independent 
knowledge of the facts at all but conjecture and hearsay. 
It was error to fail to strike this evidence at the defend-
ant's request for allowing it to remain materially preju-
diced his right to a fair trial. 
POINT IV. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD HAVE 
FOUND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY. 
Unfortunately accidents can and do happen. We do 
not condone negligent or careless driving, nor do we 
oppose attempts to improve highway safety. On the other 
hand, however, an indictable misdemeanor conviction is 
a serious matter and one which requires not negligence, 
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nor gross negligence, but conduct more extreme than 
either of these two degrees of negligence. State v. Berch-
told, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 ( 1960). 
The only possible evidence of such wanton conduct 
as could have justified a jury verdict is that evidence of 
speed developed by the testimony of Officer Burch and 
Mr. Pitcher. 
We respectfully submit that the credible evidence 
legally before the jury did not and could not support a 
\'Crdict of guilty. We submit that the verdict was based 
upon the aura of credibility which the Court's partisan 
participation gave Officer Burch's testimony, upon evi-
dence improperly received at the viewing of the premises 
and the other errors enumerated in the prior points of 
this brief. In addition, the viewing itself must have im-
properly s\vayed the jurors although the view is not 
properly evidence for them to consider but merely an 
aid to understanding the evidence. State v. Mortensen, 
26 Utah 312. 73 Pac. 562 ( 1903). 
If we strip a\vay the effect of the Court's participation 
errors. the effect of the view errors, and the improperly 
admitted testimony of Officer Burch relating to the 
measurements, there is, we respectfully submit, no credible 
evidence as to such speed as to constitute reckless dis-
regard of the safety of other. 
Even if the testimony of Officer Burch is not stricken 
. ' but is vie,,·ed as it should be if retained, the conclusion 
must be the same for in the posture in which it arises, 
his testimony is not sufficiently credible to support a 
conviction for it is patently contradictory to his sworn 
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testimony in a prior related proceeding and is only group 
recollection reconstructed and not independent evidence 
of the facts involved. 
We respectfully submit that it was error for the Court 
to refuse to grant the defendant's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant respectfully submits that there is in-
sufficient eivdence to support the verdict of guilty and 
that the several procedural errors discussed herein 
deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a 
fair trial of the facts by an impartial jury. 
The defendant prays this court to reverse the trial 
court and to remand the case with instructions to enter 
a judgement of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, 
or in the alternative to remand the case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. HARLAN BURNS 
95 North Main 
Cedar City, Utah 
Attorney for the 
Appellant-Defendant 
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